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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Does an ISP acquire the contents of its
customers’ electronic communications within
the meaning of the ECPA when the ISP uses a
device intentionally to redirect the customers’
communication to a third party without the
consent of any party to the communications.

2.

Does the fact that an ISP transmits
customers’ electronic communications in its
ordinary course of business mean that an ISP
acts within the ordinary course of business
and therefore does not engage in interception
when it reconfigures its network intentionally
to redirect customers’ communications to a
third party without the consent of any party to
the communications.
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Kathleen and Terry Kirch
respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is published at 702
F.3d 1245 and reproduced at Pet.App.1a. The district
court’s unreported opinion is reproduced at
Pet.App.20a.
JURISDICTION
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, entering judgment on December
28, 2012. The time for filing a petition for rehearing
elapsed 45 days later, on February 11, 2013. Fed. R.
App. P. 35(c), 40(a)(1). This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pertinent
portions
of
the
Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et
seq., are reproduced in the appendix to this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents the important federal
question of whether an ISP’s wholesale redirection of
its customers’ Internet communications to an
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unintended recipient without customer consent lies
outside the ISP’s ordinary course of business and
constitutes interception under the ECPA.
Here, Internet services provider Embarq,
unbeknownst to its customers, installed a device in
its Internet services network facility to transmit all
customer Internet communications to an online
advertising network. As part of that installation,
Embarq recabled its network to redirect customers’
communications through the device before resuming
the path to their intended, Internet-connected
recipients. The third-party ad network paid Embarq
for its access to the Embarq customer
communications.
The Tenth Circuit held Embarq did not
engage in interception because Embarq did not,
itself, extract any substantive content from the
communications and therefore did not acquire the
communications within the meaning of ECPA. The
court further held that, to the extent the ISP
acquired or accessed communications, its ordinary
course of business as an ISP was to transmit
communications and, since it did not extract
anything from them, its conduct constituted no more
than the ordinary course of business.
A.

Statutory Background.
1.

Electronic communications.

“The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
[ECPA] amends Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—the Federal
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wiretap law—to protect against the unauthorized
interception of electronic communications.” S. Rep.
No. 99-541, p. 43 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1986, p. 3555. “The bill amends the 1968 law
to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and
standards in light of dramatic changes in new
computer and telecommunications technologies.” Id.
An electronic communication includes “any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce,” with certain
exceptions unrelated to this case. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12). Under the definition of “electronic
communications”
adopted
in
the
ECPA,
“[c]ommunications consisting solely of data, for
example, . . . are electronic communications.” S. Rep.
No. 99-541, p. 43 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1986, p. 3568. Congress deliberately choose a
broad, functional definition because, as key sponsor
Representative Kastenmeier noted at the time:
[T]he
Electronic
Communications
Privacy Act, is an attempt to react to
and anticipate problems with the
interception and privacy of new
communications technologies. . . . Any
attempt to write a law which tries to
protect only those technologies which
exist in the marketplace today—that is,
cellular phones and electronic mail—is
destined to be outmoded in a few years.
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132 Cong. Rec. H4039-01 (June 23, 1986) (statement
of Rep. Kastenmeier).
The ECPA provides a civil remedy for any
person
whose
electronic
communication
is
wrongfully intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) and
§ 2510(4). “[T]he same civil remedies are available
whether the communication was ‘oral,’ ‘wire,’ or
‘electronic,’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510.”
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 (2001).
2.

ECPA, ISPs and the Internet.

“When you send an email or other data over
the Internet, you send it first to the ISP with which
you have service.” Steven R. Morrison, What The
Cops Can’t Do, Internet Service Providers Can:
Preserving Privacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 253, 263 (2011). “Everything we say, hear,
read, or do on the Internet first passes through ISP
computers.” Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive
ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1420
(2009). As a result, “[t]he potential threat to privacy
from unchecked ISP surveillance surpasses every
other threat online.” Id. at 1420
Congress clearly recognized the unique threat
posed by service providers possessing such
considerable access to our electronic communications. For example, the ECPA provides that, aside
from a few specific exclusions (such as disclosures
necessary to the provision of services or actually
consented to by a user):
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[A] person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the
public shall not intentionally divulge
the contents of any communication
(other than one to such person or entity,
or an agent thereof) while in
transmission on that service to any
person or entity other than an
addressee or intended recipient of such
communication or an agent of such
addressee or intended recipient.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a). In other words, absent
disclosures that are necessary, an ISP’s divulging
the contents of its customers’ communication is
statutorily excluded from the scope of its ordinary
business. Id.
Communications protected under the ECPA
include data in transmission on the Internet. “The
ECPA adopts a ‘broad, functional’ definition of an
electronic communication.” In re Pharmatrak, Inc.,
329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003), quoting Brown v.
Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995); see also
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705, citing United
States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (definition of interception under the
Wiretap Act includes packet-switch technology as
well as circuit-switch technology).
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B.

Material Facts.
1.

Embarq redirected the Kirches’
Internet communications to a
third-party.

Respondents—United Telephone Co. of
Eastern Kansas dba Embarq and Embarq
Management Co. (collectively “Embarq”)—are an
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Petitioners Kathleen
and Terry Kirch were customers of Embarq’s
Internet services in Gardner, Kansas. This case
concerns a 90-day period in the first half of 2008,
when Embarq diverted virtually all Internet
communications of the Kirches and its other 26,000
Gardner customers to a third party, NebuAd.
NebuAd, an online advertising company, paid
Embarq $29,143 for redirecting the data, which
Embarq analyzed and used to serve behaviorally
targeted online advertisements. The Kirches alleged
they did not consent to the redirection of their
communications.
2.

Embarq reconfigured its network
indiscriminately to redirect all
Internet communications of its
customers.

Embarq accomplished the redirection by
licensing from NebuAd a device, called an Ultra
Transparent Appliance (UTA), and physically
installing the device in the network through which
Embarq provided Internet services to customers.
Embarq rerouted the cables carrying its customers’
Internet traffic so that “[a]ll Internet traffic that
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passed through [Embarq’s] Gardner point of
presence
flowed
through
NebuAd’s
UTA.”
1
Pet.App.27a (emphasis added).
C.

Proceedings Below.
1.

The Kirches file suit.

The present putative class action was filed by
the Kirches against Embarq in 2010 in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas.2
Jurisdiction was based on both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (for
federal claims arising under ECPA) as well as 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The Kirches seek damages and
other relief for themselves and a class of other
customers of Embarq’s Internet services who had
their Internet communications diverted by Embarq
to NebuAd in violation of the ECPA.
2.

The district court grants Embarq’s
summary judgment motion.

Embarq moved for summary judgment
arguing: (1) it did not acquire the contents of its
The district court’s statement quoted above was, in
turn, a verbatim quote from Embarq’s own statements of
undisputed facts in support of its motion for summary
judgment. As explained by an Embarq expert witness, “The
device was placed on [Embarq’s] network in such a way that all
Internet traffic streaming through [Embarq’s] network would
also pass through the UTA.” Pet.App.13a (emphasis added).
1

An earlier-filed action in the Northern District of
California was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over
Embarq. Pet.App.22a. That case proceeded as to claims against
NebuAd (PetApp.22a) and was later resolved by a settlement.
Pet.App.8a.
2
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customers’ Internet communications; (2) the
customers
consented
to
disclosing
their
communications; or (3) the disclosures were not
interceptions because the UTA device was being
used by Embarq in the ordinary course of its
business.
The district court granted the motion.
Pet.App.21a. The district court acknowledged that
the Kirches were asserting “Embarq intercepted
communications by routing them to NebuAd’s UTA.”
Pet.App.35a. Nonetheless, according to the district
court, “[P]laintiffs’ theory rests on the notion that
the NebuAd System extracted the contents of the
communications.” Pet.App.36a. Applying this
“notion,” the court decided that Embarq did not
acquire the contents of the Kirches’ Internet
communications. Pet.App.36a-37a.
The district court also found that the Kirches
“gave or acquiesced their consent to any monitoring
or interception of their Internet activity.”
Pet.App.42a. The district court did not reach the
suggestion that Embarq used the UTA to divert
communications in the ordinary course of its
business.
3.

The Tenth Circuit
limited grounds.

affirms

on

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary
judgment. Pet.App.1a. Like the district court, the
Tenth Circuit focused on whether Embarq acquired
the contents of information compiled by NebuAd (as
opposed to whether, under the ECPA, Embarq
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acquired the contents of its customers’ Internet
communications when it redirected them to
NebuAd). Pet.App.3a, 7a-8a, 12a-15a. The Tenth
Circuit observed that Embarq merely “had access to
users’ data that it necessarily had as an ISP” and
that “NebuAd’s use of the UTA gave Embarq access
to no more of its users’ electronic communications
than it had in the ordinary course of its business as
an ISP.” Pet.App.14a.
The Kirches also appealed the district court’s
ruling as to consent. However, the Tenth Circuit did
not adjudicate this issue. Pet.App.12a.
REASONS THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED
The present case illustrates the significant
harm to societal interests in communication privacy
if an ISP is considered to be permitted, in the
ordinary course of its business, to sell its customer’s
private communications to the highest bidder. The
Tenth Circuit, in allowing an ISP to escape liability
for redirecting the Internet communications of the
ISP’s customers to a third party simply because the
ISP did not, itself, read or extract information from
the communications, has raised an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should
be, settled by this Court.
This case presents an important federal law
question of whether ISPs, the universally relied
upon purveyors of Internet communications, may
freely transmit those communications to parties
other than the intended recipients. The answer to
this question affects nothing less than the privacy of
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communications in what has perhaps become our
society’s most heavily trafficked avenue of
communication. As Justice Rehnquist observed:
Technology now permits millions
of
important
and
confidential
conversations to occur through a vast
system of electronic networks. These
advances, however, raise significant
privacy concerns. We are placed in the
uncomfortable position of not knowing
who might have access to our personal
and business e-mails, our medical and
financial records, or our cordless and
cellular telephone conversations.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542 (2001)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097,
at 69, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1968, pp.
2112, 2156); see also U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[p]eople
disclose . . . the books, groceries, and medications
they purchase to online retailers”).
Given the entrusted role ISPs play in daily
communications, both personal and business, it is
critical that the ECPA be interpreted as prohibiting
ISPs from redirecting communications at will rather
than, as in this case, excusing redirection by adding
new elements to the ECPA and, as a backstop,
excusing it as the ordinary course of business. If
ISPs are allowed to escape liability simply because
they redirect communications without first reading
them, the ECPA effectively provides no protection
against
ISPs’
routinely
selling
customer
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communications to the highest bidder, either in bulk,
or even for premiums based on particular, highly
valued customers.
Paul Olm’s article The Rise and Fall of
Invasive ISP Surveillance, succinctly captures the
heightened privacy concerns that arise under the
particular facts presented in this matter:
[N]othing in society poses as grave a
threat to privacy as the ISP, not even
Google, a company whose privacy
practices have received an inordinate
amount of criticism and commentary.
Although Google collects a vast amount
of personal information about its users,
an ISP can always access even more
because it owns and operates a
privileged network bottleneck, the only
point on the network that sits between a
user and the rest of the Internet.
Because of this fact about network
design, a user cannot say anything to
Google without saying it first to his ISP,
and an ISP can also hear everything a
user says to any other websites like
Facebook or eBay, things said that are
unobtainable to Google. The potential
threat to privacy from unchecked ISP
surveillance surpasses every other
threat online.
Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP
Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2009).
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Further, the decision below conflicts with
circuits that have recognized that one can only
redirect what one has already acquired. As has been
stated, “Redirection presupposes interception.” See,
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847 (1992) and U.S.
v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). The
decision below also conflicts with circuits that have
recognized the distinction between the initial
capture of a communication and subsequent
listening to it. See, e.g., United States v. Shields, 675
F.2d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
858 (1982); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 659
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). The
Tenth Circuit’s decision is antithetical to the
requirement, in government searches and seizures,
that a warrant be issued to install a device to collect
communications,
not
merely
to
listen
to
communications that have already been collected
through such as device. See, e.g., Katz v. U.S., 389
U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (warrant required for
surveillance by placing wiretap on outside of phone
booth).
Privacy of communication is an important
interest. The ECPA helps to protect the “right to be
let alone” as well as promote “the interest . . . in
fostering private speech.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536
(Breyer, J., concurring), quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). As this Court has recognized, “fear of
public disclosure of private conversations might well
have a chilling effect on private speech.” Bartnicki,
532 U.S. at 532-533. Even a plausible threat to
communications strike at core values in our society:
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In a democratic society privacy of
communication is essential if citizens
are to think and act creatively and
constructively. Fear or suspicion that
one’s speech is being monitored by a
stranger, even without the reality of
such activity, can have a seriously
inhibiting effect upon the willingness to
voice critical and constructive ideas.
Id. at 533 (quoting President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 (1967)); see
also, id. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). It
is entirely appropriate that Congress has prohibited
unauthorized interception of communicative content
that the interceptor does not, itself, read, hear, or
extract, or access. Here, Embarq was able to provide
a complete version of the communications to an
unintended party and that is enough.
Pervasively, Americans trust their ISPs to
deliver all manner of personal and business
communications to the intended recipients. “[T]he
content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). The necessary trust
placed in an ISP, and its necessary access
to communications, justifies the Congressional
prohibition
against
its
redirection
of
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a).
Allowing ISPs to divert Internet communications
under the circumstances at issue here will have farreaching and negative consequences for a society
that values the privacy of communications.
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A.

An
electronic
communication
is
intercepted
when,
without
lawful
purpose, the whole of it is redirected to
an unintended recipient, regardless of
whether communicative content is
subsequently extracted from it.

Without discussion, the Tenth Circuit began
with
an
unfounded
distinction
between
communications consisting of data and “information
the
NebuAd
System
extracted
from
the
communications” that Embarq diverted. Pet.App.3a,
7a-8a, 10a. The court wrongly presumed that
information must be extracted from communications
for the contents to have been acquired under the
statute. See, e.g., Pet.App.3a (“NebuAd acquired
various information about Embarq users . . .
Embarq’s access to that information . . . .”)
(emphasis added). In fact, the data redirected by
Embarq and provided to NebuAd (i.e., all Internet
traffic) obviously contained the contents of the
Internet communications included within. Indeed, as
a practical matter, when Embarq installed the UTA
device and reconfigured the Internet traffic in its
network facility, the full traffic stream, including
communicative content, had no place to go but where
Embarq redirected it; were that not so, those
contents would never have reached NebuAd as they
obviously did.
Because the Tenth Circuit proceeded from the
erroneous premise that interception could only be
predicated on acquisition that reaches the point of
extraction, the court improperly focused on the fact
that Embarq did not acquire extracted content from
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NebuAd. Pet.App.3a, 13a-14a. However, the
interception in this case occurred when Embarq
redirected the Kirches’ Internet communications, in
their entirety, to NebuAd. In other words, the Tenth
Circuit’s imposition of a new, extraction requirement
caused it to look in the wrong direction.
NebuAd was not the intended recipient of the
Kirches’ communications. Embarq did not have the
Kirches’ consent to redirect their communications to
NebuAd, or anyone else. Embarq thus violated the
ECPA by using a device to intentionally redirect
such communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
The ECPA’s prohibition against unauthorized
interception requires no inquiry into whether or how
intercepted communications are used. Id. As the
Seventh Circuit said of one interception defendant,
“He did not learn anything worthwhile. But an
intentional interception is enough; the prosecutor
need not show that the spy obtained valuable
information.” Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 703; see
also U.S. v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.
1993) (“[a]ll that is relevant is that Townsend
intentionally intercepted communications between
two unknowing and unconsenting individuals”).
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s opinion below,
an interception in violation of the ECPA does not
require that an electronic communication be read,
heard, or extracted. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Rather, an
interception occurs “when the contents . . . are
captured or redirected in any way.” Rodriguez, 968
F.2d at 136.
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The statute does not specify precisely
where an interception is deemed to
occur. It seems clear that when the
contents of a wire communication are
captured or redirected in any way, an
interception occurs at that time. Such
an interception plainly occurs at or near
the situs of the telephone itself, for the
contents of the conversation, whether
bilateral as is usually the case, or
multilateral as is the case with a
conference call, are transmitted in one
additional
direction.
Redirection
presupposes interception.
Id. at 136 (emphasis added); see also Luong, 471
F.3d at 1109 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 112
F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997) and United States v.
Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996)). In the
present case, it is clear that Embarq intentionally
caused the Kirches’ Internet communications to be
transmitted to NebuAd, that is, as the Second
Circuit put it in Rodriguez, “transmitted in one
additional direction.”
Even construing the far more narrow term
“aural acquisition,” courts have agreed that listening
to the communication is not required to intercept.
See Shields, 675 F.2d at 1156 (holding interception
under the statute “occurred at the time the recording
was made, not when persons listened to the tape”),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); see also United
States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1527 (11th Cir.)
(“the term ‘intercept’ as it relates to ‘aural
acquisitions’ refers to the place where a
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communication is initially obtained regardless of
where the communication is ultimately heard”), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988); United States v. Turk,
526 F.2d at 659 (“we conclude that no new and
distinct interception occurs when the contents of a
communication are revealed through the replaying of
a previous recording”). In short, “the term ‘intercept’
as it relates to an ‘acquisition’ refers to the place
where a communication is initially obtained” and
“[w]hether the communication is heard by the
human ear is irrelevant.” Amati v. City of Woodstock,
Ill., 829 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
For example, in Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d
515 (9th Cir. 1978), the court rejected an argument
that a phone company should not be liable for its
part in an illegal wiretap where the police, not the
phone company, listened to the conversations.
Nevada Bell contends that because none
of its employees actually listened to
tapped conversations, it has not violated
the statute.
...
[W]e do not believe that Congress meant
to allow those tapping phones to
determine the possible scope of civil
liability by their limiting who among
them would listen to the tapes.
Id. at 522. It is equally clear that Congress did not
mean to allow parties to escape liability for
redirecting electronic communications by their
limiting who among them would read or extract
information from the diverted communications.
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If Congress had intended wiretap liability to
depend on reading or extracting information rather
than mere control over the transmittal of the
communication sufficient to have acquired it,
Congress clearly would have provided a very
different definition of interception. As one court has
recognized, when deciding that aural acquisition
does not require listening:
If Congress had intended the phrase
“aural or other acquisition” to mean
“overheard,” it certainly could have
employed the simpler term. The
section’s additional requirement that a
conversation be acquired “through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device” suggests that it is the act
of diverting, and not the act of listening,
that constitutes an “interception.”
In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235, 1264
(D. Conn. 1995).
The statute simply does not require reading or
visual acquisition of the contents of an electronic
communication. Indeed, beyond “aural acquisition,”
which does not require listening, the far broader
term, “or other acquisition” was added by Congress
for the specific purposes of protecting even
communications consisting solely of data. S. Rep. No.
99-541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1986, p. 3568. The new language
extended privacy protection to new forms of
computer-to-computer communications. Rodriguez,
968 F.2d at 136, citing S. Rep. No. 99-541, 99th

19
Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1986, pp. 3555, 3555-57, 3562-65, 3567. “This
amendment clarifies that it is illegal to intercept the
non-voice portion of a wire communication. For
example, it is illegal to intercept the data or digitized
portion of a voice communication.” Id. at 3567.
The very nature of the technologies involved
renders communications unintelligible to human
eyes and ears while in transmission on the Internet,
precisely when such communications might be
intercepted under the ECPA. Thus, if the contents of
electronic communications are to be protected from
interception while in transmission, they must be
protected without requiring proof of inspection or
extraction. The Tenth Circuit, by assuming that
electronic communications must be extracted to have
been intercepted, improperly added a requirement
that the statute was designed to avoid.
Additionally, if the Tenth Circuit decision
stands and extraction becomes a prerequisite for a
finding of interception, then a violation of the statute
could occur every time the same raw data is
translated into an intelligible form—i.e., a new
violation each time a particular computer file is
opened. Of course, “[t]his cannot be what Congress
intended.” See In re State Police Litigation, 888 F.
Supp. at 1265 (“Defendants’ proposed interpretation,
in contrast, leads to bizarre results. If an
interception occurs only when a defendant actually
listens to a recorded conversation, a violation of the
Act could occur on every subsequent occasion when
that recording is replayed.”) (citing Turk, 526 F.2d at
658.)
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Construed properly, the ECPA’s prohibition
against unauthorized interception of an electronic
communication while in transmission requires that
the interceptor acquire, that is, possess or exercise
control over the communication, including its
contents; interception does not require the
extraction, translation, reading, or use of the
contents. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4); see, e.g., Klumb v.
Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 2012)
(interception occurred when computer program
caused duplicate of e-mail “to be rerouted
automatically through the Internet to a third party
address”); Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620,
630 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (interception occurred when
surveillance software “acquired and logged Plaintiff’s
text messages” and not when the defendants
subsequently accessed them).
Embarq has suggested the data it redirected
was like a letter inside a sealed envelope that
Embarq did not read. One problem with Embarq’s
envelope analogy is that it ignores the facts of this
case. Here, it would be somewhat more fitting to
analogize that Embarq was entrusted to deliver a
postcard to the intended recipient. However, before
it did so, Embarq copied the postcard and sent the
copy to NebuAd. Under the ECPA, it does not matter
whether Embarq “peeked” at the postcard while
copying it. It is enough that, just as Embarq
acquired the postcard enough to send it on its lawful
way, it was Embarq’s acquisition that enabled
Embarq to redirect it. Otherwise, if Embarq did not
acquire the contents of the Kirches Internet
communications, those communications could not
have reached NebuAd as well as intended recipients.
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Embarq obviously did acquire the contents of
the communications at issue, or it could not have
redirected them. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136
(“[r]edirection presupposes interception”). If Embarq
had examined the contents, but for some lawful
purpose, it still would not excuse its redirection; the
fact that Embarq did not examine the
communications
before
redirecting
them is
irrelevant to any analysis under the ECPA.
B.

The
ECPA
presupposes
acquisition of customers’
communications.

an
ISP’s
electronic

An ISP necessarily acquires its customers’
Internet communications, in their entirety, including
contents, by assuming control over those
communications to transmit them. When ISPs help
those communications reach their intended
destination, there is obviously no interception under
the ECPA. Indeed, the ECPA provides that an ISP
may direct a communication to others whose job it is
to “forward such communication to its destination.”
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iii). However, it is an entirely
different matter when an ISP, instead, intentionally
redirects a customer’s communication to a third
party that is not the intended recipient and who has
nothing to do with forwarding the communication to
its destination. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (ISP “shall
not intentionally divulge the contents of any
communication . . . while in transmission on that
service to any person or entity other than an
addressee or intended recipient.”).
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The Tenth Circuit held that “NebuAd’s use of
the UTA gave Embarq access to no more of its users’
electronic communications than it had in the
ordinary course of its business as an ISP.”
Pet.App.14a-15a. Of course, as an ISP, Embarq had
essentially total access to its customers’ Internet
communications. Embarq clearly had sufficient
access to the communications at issue to be able to
redirect them to a third party. As explained in the
previous section of this petition, the definition of
interception is satisfied when one takes sufficient
control of an electronic communication such that it
communication is “transmitted in one additional
direction.” Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136. Because
Embarq clearly had sufficient control and possession
of the Internet communications to redirect them to
NebuAd, no further inquiry into acquisition is
necessary.
If the Tenth Circuit meant that Embarq
redirected these communications in the ordinary
course of its business as an ISP, such a holding
would be directly contrary to the ECPA. Other than
matters that are necessary to providing service, the
ECPA
specifically
excludes
redirecting
communications from the ordinary business of an
ISP:
[A] person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the
public shall not intentionally divulge
the contents of any communication
(other than one to such person or entity,
or an agent thereof) while in
transmission on that service to any
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person or entity other than an
addressee or intended recipient of such
communication or an agent of such
addressee or intended recipient.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a). In other words, aside from
specific and limited exceptions not applicable here,
one thing that Congress has excluded from being
part of ISP’s ordinary business is redirecting its
customers’
communications.
Id.
Although,
hypothetically, a necessary redirection might be
considered part of an ISP’s ordinary business, there
has been no argument or evidence in this case that
Embarq’s redirection of communications to NebuAd
was necessary to Embarq’s provision of services to
customers or any other business necessity.
The Tenth Circuit failed to point to any
provision of the ECPA or any case law that actually
supports the notion that, by virtue of an ISP’s mere
access to customer communications in the ordinary
course of business, the ISP may intentionally
redirect those communications, without consent, to
third parties not designated as recipients.
Ironically, the single case cited by the court as
supporting its conclusion is Hall v. EarthLink
Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2005). Hall does not
involve an ISP redirecting communications to an
unintended third party. In fact, Hall does not even
involve a third party. Rather, the case involves an
ISP and a user. The ISP stored emails at the user’s
old address on the ISP’s system. The emails were not
redirected to any third party. As explained by the
district court in the case, the ISP “merely received
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and stored e-mails precisely where they were sent—
to an address on the Earthlink system.” Hall v.
Earthlink Network, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 5489 (RO), 2003
WL 22990064 (S.D.N.Y. December 19, 2003).
Unsurprisingly, the court held that storing emails
“precisely where they were sent” was done by the
ISP in the ordinary course of business.
In the present case, the ISP did the exact
opposite of directing communications precisely
where they were sent. Here, Embarq intentionally
redirected its customers’ communications to
NebuAd. Hall does not support the conclusion
reached by the Tenth Circuit in the present case.
Nothing in the ECPA supports that conclusion
either.
C.

Remand is necessary.

Because of the Tenth Circuit’s erroneous
construction of “interception” under the ECPA, it
never reached the question of whether Embarq
established as a matter of law that the Kirches
consented to the interception at issue. Petitioners
respectfully request that this court grant this
petition, reverse the court of appeals, and remand
this case to the court of appeals to address the issue
of consent.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.
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Rahul Ravipudi, Panish, Shea & Boyle, LLP, (Paul
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Before MURPHY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit
Judges.
____________________________________
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
____________________________________
Plaintiffs Kathleen and Terry Kirch appeal
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Defendants United Telephone Company of
Eastern Kansas and Embarq Management Company
(collectively “Embarq”) on the Kirches’ claim that
Embarq intercepted their Internet communications
in violation of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848. Embarq is an Internet service provider
(ISP). The alleged interceptions occurred when
Embarq authorized NebuAd, Inc., an online
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advertising company, to conduct a technology test for
directing online advertising to the users most likely
to be interested in the ads. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. Although NebuAd acquired various
information about Embarq users during the course
of the technology test, Embarq cannot be liable as an
aider and abettor. And it was undisputed that
Embarq’s access to that information was no different
from its access to any other data flowing over its
network. Because this access was only in the
ordinary course of providing Internet services as an
ISP, this access did not constitute an interception
within the meaning of the statute.
I.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The ECPA prohibits the interception of
“electronic communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), and
imposes criminal and civil liability, see id. §§ 2511(4)
(criminal penalties); § 2520 (civil liability for
damages). Traffic on the Internet is electronic
communication. See id. § 2510(12) (defining
electronic communication as “any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system”).
The statute defines intercept as “the aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” Id.
§ 2510(4) (emphasis added). No “interception,” and
hence no violation of the ECPA, occurs if the


4a
contents of a communication are acquired in the
ordinary course of business of an ISP because the
Act’s definition of electronic, mechanical, or other
device excludes “any telephone or telegraph
instrument, equipment or facility, or any component
thereof . . . (ii) being used by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary
course of its business . . . .” Id. § 2510(5)(a); see Hall
v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 503–05 (2d
Cir. 2005). An interception to which a party to the
communication consents also is not prohibited. See
id. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful under this
chapter for a person . . . to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication . . . where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception . . . .”)
The ECPA imposes civil liability on those who
unlawfully intercept electronic communications. It
states:
Except
as
provided
in
section
2511(2)(a)(ii) [relating to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978],
any person whose wire, oral or
electronic communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in
violation of this chapter may in a civil
action recover from the person or entity,
other than the United States, which
engaged in that violation such relief as
may be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (emphasis added). This language
does not encompass aiders or abettors. The only
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persons liable are those who engaged in “that
violation.” And the natural reading of “that
violation” is the “intercept[ion], disclos[ure], or
intentional[] use[] . . . in violation of [the statute].” In
other words, “the person or entity . . . which engaged
in that violation” is the person or entity that
“intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used” the
communication. The provision includes no aidingand-abetting language. As the Supreme Court has
said:
Congress has not enacted a general civil
aiding and abetting statute . . . . Thus,
when Congress enacts a statute under
which a person may sue and recover
damages from a private defendant for
the defendant’s violation of some
statutory norm, there is no general
presumption that the plaintiff may also
sue aiders and abettors.
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994).
Any temptation to read the statute as
imposing aider-and-abettor liability is overcome by
the illuminating statutory history of the civilliability provision. The 1968 predecessor to the
ECPA imposed both criminal and civil liability for
those who procured an interception. The criminal
provision, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1968),
held responsible “any person who . . . willfully
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept,
any wire or oral communication.” Pub. L. No. 90-351,
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Title III § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (1968) (emphasis
added). (Later paragraphs made it a crime to
willfully disclose or use unlawfully intercepted
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), (d)
(1968).) Similarly, the civilliability provision stated:
“Any person whose wire or oral communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this
chapter shall . . . have a civil cause of action against
any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or
procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or
use such communications.” Id., 82 Stat. at 223
(emphasis added) (enacting former 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520). When the ECPA was enacted in 1986, the
criminal provision was changed only to replace
“willfully” by “intentionally” and to add “electronic”
communications to “wire” and “oral” ones. See 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). But the civil provision was
altered in additional ways, including deletion of the
“procures” clause. We presume that this deletion was
intended to change the statute’s meaning. See Stone
v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995); Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts § 40 (2012) (“If the legislature amends
or reenacts a provision other than by way of a
consolidating statute or restyling project, a
significant change in language is presumed to entail
a change in meaning.”). Accordingly, almost all
courts to address the issue have held that § 2520
does not impose civil liability on aiders or abettors.
See Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 169 (5th
Cir. 2000); Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action
Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, No. 09-02030, 2012 WL
4054141, *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2012) (collecting
cases). But see Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d
419, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y 2006).


7a
II.

THE TECHNOLOGY TEST

In November 2007 Embarq entered into an
agreement with NebuAd to conduct a test of what is
referred to as the NebuAd System. The physical
components of the system were an Ultra
Transparent Appliance (UTA) and remote servers
(apparently in California) hosted by NebuAd. The
system’s purported purpose was to “allow[] for
placement of optimized advertisement on Trial
customers’ internet browser screens.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I at 92. The test began in mid-December 2007
and ended in March 2008. Under the agreement the
UTA was installed in Embarq’s network in Gardner,
Kansas, where the Kirches were customers of
Embarq. Embarq’s Gardner users were connected to
the UTA, which was connected to the rest of
Embarq’s network. According to the Kirches, the
Internet traffic that passed through the UTA was
sent to the NebuAd servers in its system. NebuAd
used the UTA to track what websites an Embarq
user visited, and to deliver online advertising
thought likely to interest users who visited those
websites.
Embarq asserts that the NebuAd System
collected only information about customer requests
for highly trafficked commercial websites, and
obtained only three pieces of information about such
requests: the requested Uniform Resource Locator
(URL, known in common parlance as a web page’s
“address”), the “referer URL” (the last URL visited
before the request), and an advertising network
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cookie.1 Because cookies are typically encrypted, the
NebuAd System did not extract any information
from them. Users’ computers were assigned
identification numbers based on these cookies, and
the information about past Internet usage was
associated with a user’s computer only through this
number. The Kirches contend, however, that the
UTA “intercepted and analyzed” all Internet traffic
from affected customers, id. at 61, not only their
requests for highly trafficked commercial websites.
III.

PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT

The Kirches sued Embarq in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas on
behalf of themselves and other Embarq customers.
They asserted four claims arising out of the NebuAd
test: unlawful interception of communications in
violation of the ECPA; accessing plaintiffs’
computers without authorization, in violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a), (g); invasion of privacy under Kansas state
law; and trespass to chattels under Kansas state
law. The latter three claims were dismissed with
prejudice by joint stipulation of the parties.2
Embarq then moved for summary judgment
on the unlawful-interception claim. It argued that

“A cookie is a piece of text, usually encrypted, that is
sent to a user’s computer by a website. When the user later
returns to the website, the website recognizes the cookie and
thus is able to track a user’s behavior over time.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. II at 278.
1

The Kirches sued NebuAd in a separate proceeding.
At oral argument we were informed that the case was settled.
2
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(1) the NebuAd System had not intercepted users’
communications, because the limited information it
acquired about their Internet communications did
not include the contents of those communications;
(2) even if user communications were intercepted by
the NebuAd System, it was not Embarq that had
intercepted the communications, because Embarq
did not have access to the data collected by the
NebuAd System or the user profiles that NebuAd
developed; (3) the Kirches had consented to any
alleged interception by agreeing to the terms of
Embarq’s privacy policy, which gave users notice
that their Internet communications could be shared
with third parties to the extent that the NebuAd test
had done so; and (4) if Embarq had acquired the
contents of any of its users’ communications, it had
done so only in the ordinary course of its business
activities as an ISP, and so was not liable under the
ECPA.
The district court granted Embarq’s motion in
August 2011. It first ruled that Embarq had not
intercepted the Kirches’ communications. It
explained:
Plaintiffs
argue
that
Embarq
intercepted communications by routing
them to NebuAd’s UTA. The term
“intercept” is specifically defined by the
ECPA to mean the “acquisition of the
contents”
of
a
communication.[]
“Contents” is defined to mean “the
substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication.” Although the term
“acquisition” is not defined by the
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statute, “to acquire” commonly means
“to come into possession, control, or
power of disposal.” Thus, it follows that
in order to “intercept” a communication,
one must come into possession or
control of the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication. The
Court agrees with Embarq that
regardless of what information the
NebuAd System extracted from the
communications traversing through the
UTA, it is undisputed that Embarq
had no access to that information or to
the profiles constructed from that
information. As plaintiffs’ expert
testified, Embarq’s role was to install
the NebuAd device so as to furnish the
UTA connection to NebuAd. In other
words, the NebuAd device, or “box,” goes
into place, then all of the raw data that
flows through Embarq is directed to
that device, where NebuAd does the
analysis and, apparently, separates out
the Port 80 traffic [apparently, traffic to
websites whose addresses begin with
“http://”]. Moreover, plaintiffs cite no
authority that Embarq’s access to the
raw data that flowed through its
network constitutes a violation of the
ECPA, which requires an entity to
actually acquire the contents of those
communications. There is nothing in the
record that Embarq itself acquired the
contents of any communications as they
flowed through its network; instead,


11a
plaintiffs’
theory
rests
on
the
notion that the NebuAd System
extracted
the
contents
of
the
communications. Plaintiffs’ assertion
that Embarq “endeavored to intercept”
communications falls short of creating
civil liability under the ECPA, which
creates liability for actual interception.
Mem. & Order at 13–14 (footnotes omitted), Kirch v.
Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 10-2047-JAR (D. Kan. Aug.
19, 2011)(Aplt. Br., Ex. A at 13–14). The court then
rejected the argument that Embarq could be liable
on a theory of aiding and abetting NebuAd. In the
alternative, the court ruled that the Kirches had
consented to any interception by agreeing to the
terms of Embarq’s privacy policy.
IV.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s
summary-judgment
decision,
evaluating
the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. See Vaughn v.
Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008).
A district court can grant summary judgment only if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”
and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Like the district court, we need not address
whether NebuAd intercepted any of the Kirches’
electronic communications. Because the ECPA
creates no aiding-and-abetting civil liability,
Embarq is liable only if it itself intercepted those
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communications. Also, although the district court
relied on consent as an alternative ground for
summary judgment, we need not consider the issue
because we hold that there was no interception.
We largely agree with the district court’s
analysis. As we explain below, it is undisputed that
the only access Embarq had to the data extracted by
NebuAd was in its capacity as an ISP, not because of
any special relationship with NebuAd or the
technology test. We need not decide where to draw
the line between access to data and acquisition of
data, because Embarq’s access was in the ordinary
course of its core business as an ISP transmitting
data over its equipment. Even if such access might
be deemed an acquisition, Embarq did not engage in
an “interception” under the ECPA because of the
ordinary-course-of-business exclusion from the
definition of interception. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(4)
(defining intercept as the “acquisition of the contents
of any . . . electronic . . . communication” by use of an
“electronic,
mechanical
or
other
device”);
2510(5)(a)(ii) (excluding from the definition of
“electronic, mechanical or other device” any
equipment “used by a provider of wire or electronic
communication services in the ordinary course of its
business”).
The relevant facts were established in the
summary-judgment proceedings. In its motion for
summary judgment, Embarq asserted that it was
undisputed that “Embarq did not have access to the
data collected by the NebuAd System.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. II at 280. To support this contention, Embarq
cited several statements in the record: (1) The
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Kirches’ expert, Alissa Cooper, was asked at her
deposition, “Did the ISP obtain access to raw data
from NebuAd in any way other than an ISP
ordinarily has the raw data, which is to say that it
flows through the ISP’s network?” She responded, “I
don’t think so.” Id. at 450. (2) The Kirches’ expert
Andrew Case said at his deposition that Embarq did
not have access to “the raw data collected by
NebuAd.” Id. at 468. And (3) Embarq’s expert Dr.
Ellis Horowitz stated in his report that Embarq
“neither purchased, leased, nor paid for the UTA,
which at all times was owned and controlled by
NebuAd. The device was placed on [Embarq’s]
network in such a way that all Internet traffic
streaming through [Embarq’s] network would also
pass through the UTA.” Id. at 376.
In a summary-judgment proceeding a party’s
assertion of undisputed facts is ordinarily credited
by the court unless properly disputed by the
opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a
party . . . fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact . . . , the court may . . . (2) consider
the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion . . . .”);
Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283–84
(10th Cir. 2010) (opponent’s response to summaryjudgment motion must raise a factual dispute that is
material to the motion); D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b)(1)
(memorandum in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must “contai[n] a concise
statement of material facts as to which the party
contends a genuine issue exists[,] . . . refer[ring] with
particularity to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing party relies”); id. at 56.1(e) (“All
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responses must fairly meet the substance of the
matter asserted.”).
The Kirches’ response did not adequately
dispute Embarq’s assertion. It stated only:
“Undisputed that Embarq did not have access to the
data after it was collected by NebuAd servers.
However, Embarq did have access to the raw data
when it flowed through their network.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I at 64. In support, the Kirches cited only the
following exchange in the Cooper deposition:
Q: Did the ISP get any of the raw data
that NebuAd may have looked at?
A: I don’t know.
Q: Do you have any reason to think that
it did?
A: Well, the raw data is just flowing
over its network, so it has access to the
raw data.
Id., Vol. II at 450. Thus, the Kirches’ only
qualification to their acceptance of the alleged
undisputed fact was that Embarq had access to
users’ data that it necessarily had as an ISP.
In other words, the undisputed facts establish
that NebuAd’s use of the UTA gave Embarq access
to no more of its users’ electronic communications
than it had in the ordinary course of its business as
an ISP. Embarq is therefore protected from liability
by the statutory exemption for activities conducted
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in the ordinary course of a service provider’s
business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).
Supporting our conclusion is the Second
Circuit’s decision in Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc.,
396 F.3d 500 (2005). Hall used Earthlink as his ISP.
See id. at 502. Later his account was closed, but
several hundred emails were sent to his Earthlink
address after the closure and stored in Earthlink
servers. See id. Hall sued, claiming that Earthlink
had unlawfully intercepted this mail “by
intentionally continuing to receive messages sent [to
his closed email address] after the termination of his
account.” Id. The court held that Earthlink was not
liable. It explained that “Earthlink acquired the
contents of electronic communications but did so in
the ordinary course of business,” so there was no
“interception” within the statutory definition. Id. at
504–05.3
The Kirches seek to escape the import of the
undisputed facts by asserting that Embarq had
“control and possession of the UTA” during the time
it was installed on Embarq’s network. Aplt. Br. at

3 The court said that “[i]f ISPs were not covered by the
ordinary course of business exception, ISPs would constantly be
intercepting communications under ECPA because their basic
services involve the ‘acquisition of the contents’ of electronic
communication.” Hall, 396 F.3d at 505. As we stated above,
however, we need not decide where to draw the line between
access and acquisition of data.
The Hall court’s statement was made during its
explanation of its holding that the course-of-business exception
applies not only to telephone or telegraph equipment used by
an ISP, but also to any other equipment used by an ISP. See id.
at 504–05. That issue has not been raised in this appeal, so we
need not address it.
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16. But control and possession of the device is not
the test. If such control or possession gave Embarq
access to the contents of communications beyond
what it acquired in the ordinary course of business,
the Kirches needed to provide evidence of such
access in response to Embarq’s assertion of
undisputed fact.
The Kirches also point to two letters to
Congress submitted by Embarq in July 2008,
describing the NebuAd technology test and Embarq’s
role in the test. These letters asserted that the test
had not captured users’ confidential information and
stated that the test was conducted in accordance
with Embarq’s privacy policies, industry standards,
and agency guidance. The Kirches rely on portions of
the letters (1) stating that “Embarq conducted a
brief, small-scale test of customer preference
advertising utilizing a new technology,” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I at 111; (2) referring to “our consumer
preference marketing test,” id. at 115; and (3)
stating that “we have no plans for more tests or for
general deployment of this technology,” id. at 118.
The Kirches characterize these statements as a
“clear party admission” that it was Embarq, not
NebuAd, that used the UTA and thereby intercepted
its users’ communications. Aplt. Br. at 17. We
disagree. The Kirches read too much into the letters.
The letters did not attempt to delineate the division
of responsibility between Embarq and NebuAd.
Indeed, they never mention NebuAd. The letters
were in response to Congressional inquiries about
the type of advertising examined in the technology
test. The concern was about the nature of the
technology and the conduct of the test. There was no
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need or reason for Embarq’s letters to be lengthened
by a description of who was responsible for what.
The letters are consistent with Embarq’s account of
the technology test in the district court and do not
contradict the undisputed fact that Embarq’s only
access to data collected by the UTA was in the
ordinary course of its business as an ISP.
V.

CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.
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Case No. 10-2047-JAR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Kathleen and Terry Kirch filed this putative
class action against Internet service providers
Embarq Management Company and United
Telephone Company of Eastern Kansas (collectively,
“Embarq”). Plaintiffs allege common law claims for
invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels, as well
as claims for violation of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and the federal Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). All claims
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relate to Embarq’s collection and diversion of its
customers’ Internet communications to a third party
Internet advertising company, NebuAd, Inc.
(“NebuAd”), who used the information to target the
customers with advertising. Per stipulation,
plaintiffs agreed to dismiss Counts I, III and IV
(invasion of privacy, CFAA and trespass to
chattels).1 Before the Court are two motions:
plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 31) and
defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59)
seeking to dismiss the remaining ECPA claim. Oral
argument was held July 15, 2011, at which time the
Court took the motions under advisement. After
considering the parties’ arguments and submissions,
the Court is ready to rule. For the reasons set forth
in detail below, the Court grants defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment and denies plaintiffs’ Motion
to Certify Class as moot.2

1

Doc. 60, Ex. 1.

2 The Complaint also names Doe Defendants 1-5, who
are identified as “entities associated with Embarq and/or UTC,
possibly with contractual obligations with Defendants, that
may require Defendants to provide notice to the Does of this
matter so as to appear and represent their interests. When the
identities of any Does who are sued as Does are identified,
Plaintiffs will amend their complaint to name such parties.”
Although a plaintiff may generally plead claims against
unknown defendants, he must “provide [] an adequate
description of some kind which is sufficient to identify the
person involved so process eventually can be served.” Fisher v.
Okla. Dep’t of Corr. Unknown State Actor and/or Actors, 213 F.
App’x 704, 708 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Roper v. Grayson,
81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996)). Here, the Complaint does
not allege with any specificity which claims involve the Doe
defendants or what roles those unknown individuals might
have played in this matter, nor have plaintiffs moved to amend
the Complaint to name such parties. Because all other claims
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I.

Procedural Background

In November, 2008, plaintiffs Kathleen and
Terry Kirch, as well as others, brought suit in the
Northern District of California against NebuAd,
Embarq, and several other Internet service providers
(“ISPs”), alleging violations of the ECPA.3 Embarq
moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, and the
California court dismissed the complaint against
Embarq and the other ISPs for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs refiled against Embarq in the
District of Kansas; other plaintiffs refiled against
other ISPs in Montana, Alabama, Georgia, and
Illinois, using common counsel in Los Angeles.
Plaintiffs continue to pursue their case against
NebuAd in California.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the
moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact” and that it is
“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”4 In
applying this standard, the court views the evidence
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.5 A fact is

against Embarq are dismissed below, the Court dismisses these
Doe defendants as well.
Valentine et al. v. NebuAd Inc., et al., No. 3:08-cv05113 (N.D. Cal.).
3

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904
(10th Cir. 2002).
5
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“material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it
is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”6
An issue of fact is “genuine” if “there is sufficient
evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact
could resolve the issue either way.”7
The moving party initially must show the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.8 In
attempting to meet this standard, a movant that
does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial need not negate the other party’s claim; rather,
the movant need simply point out to the court a lack
of evidence for the other party on an essential
element of that party’s claim.9
Once the movant has met this initial burden,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.”10 The nonmoving party may not

6 Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc.,
259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Adler v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)).
7 Adler, 144 F.3d at 670 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
8 Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).

Adams v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242,
1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Adler, 144 F.3d at 671).
9

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
10
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simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden.11
Rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific
facts that would be admissible in evidence in the
event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could
find for the nonmovant.”12 To accomplish this, the
facts “must be identified by reference to an affidavit,
a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit
incorporated therein.”13 Rule 56(c)(4) provides that
opposing affidavits must be made on personal
knowledge and shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence.14 The non-moving party
cannot avoid summary judgment by repeating
conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by
specific facts, or speculation.15 “
Finally, summary judgment is not a
“disfavored procedural shortcut”; on the contrary, it
is an important procedure “designed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action.”16 In responding to a motion for summary
judgment, “a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts,
on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape

11 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; accord Eck v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2001).

Mitchell v. City of Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 119798 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Adler, 144 F.3d at 671).
12

13

Adams, 233 F.3d at 1246.

14

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

Id.; Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc.,
452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
15

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327
(1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
16
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summary judgment in the mere hope that something
will turn up at trial.”17
III.

Uncontroverted Facts

Consistent with the well-established standard
for evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the
following facts are either uncontroverted or stated in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The
Court notes that the majority of the facts set forth by
Embarq are either undisputed, or that plaintiffs
claim to lack information to dispute the facts
asserted. With respect to the latter, however,
plaintiffs do not assert that relief is appropriate
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), and because Rule 56(e)
requires a plaintiff to properly address another
party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),
the Court thus considers such facts as undisputed.18
United Telephone Company of Eastern
Kansas (“UTC”) is, among other things, an ISP that
provides high-speed Internet services to subscribers
in Kansas. At all relevant times, UTC did business
under the brand name “Embarq.” Embarq
Management Company (“EMC”) is a corporate
affiliate of UTC and provides contracted products,
services, and employees to UTC and other
CenturyLink subsidiaries. EMC provides no services
to the public and has no customer-facing operations.

17

1988).

Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; D. Kan. Rule 56.1(e) (requiring
responding party to specifically set forth in detail the reasons
why they cannot admit or deny a fact).
18
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NebuAd’s Role
NebuAd is a company headquartered in
California that operated as an online advertising
company. NebuAd contracted with a number of ISPs
to allow it to install its Ultra-Transparent Appliance
(“UTA”) on the ISPs’ networks. NebuAd sought to
deliver advertisements targeted to the interests of
individuals who used the ISPs’ networks, based on
interest profiles constructed by NebuAd’s UTA and
associated server computers (“the NebuAd System”).
The NebuAd System built interest profiles based on
information concerning certain websites that users
visited.
In November 2007, on behalf of UTC, EMC
entered into a Technology Trial Evaluation
Agreement with NebuAd to test the UTA. Company
personnel
performed
laboratory
tests
and
determined that routing Internet traffic through the
UTA did not affect network integrity or performance.
After laboratory testing was complete, it was decided
to allow NebuAd to field test the UTA in a “live”
environment. UTC’s Gardner, Kansas point of
presence was selected for the test (“the NebuAd
test”) because it was the smallest point of presence,
with approximately 26,000 high-speed Internet
subscribers, and it was proximate to qualified
technical and product development staff. EMC does
not own the network facilities on which the NebuAd
equipment was installed; rather, those network
facilities are owned and operated by UTC. The
NebuAd test began in mid-December 2007 and was
stopped completely by the end of March 2008.



27a
Embarq received $29,143 from
compensation for the NebuAd test.

NebuAd

as

Plaintiffs’ experts admitted that NebuAd’s
UTA did not degrade the performance of any
customer’s Internet service, and plaintiffs have
stipulated that NebuAd’s UTA caused no damage to
any Embarq customer’s computer. The NebuAd
System did not serve pop-up advertisements. The
System did not increase the number of
advertisements served to a user, but rather, served
advertisements only in place of the advertisements
that otherwise would have been served to the user.
The System was authorized by other advertising
networks to replace their advertisements with its
own.
All Internet traffic that passed through UTC’s
Gardner point of presence flowed through NebuAd’s
UTA. NebuAd’s UTA identified the “port number”
associated with each internet communication
passing through UTC’s Gardner point of presence.
Different port numbers are associated with different
types of Internet communications. Port 80 is
associated with “HTTP traffic,” and only websites
whose addresses begin with “http://” are accessed
through Port 80. An IP address is a series of
numbers associated with a server or website, and it
is used to route traffic to the proper destination on
the Internet. The NebuAd System employed a
technology called “deep packet inspection” (“DPI”) to
identify the URL requested by a user. A URL, which
stands for “Uniform Resource Locator,” is the
address of a page on the world wide web. URLs
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specify the host server name, directory, and file
name of the Web page that a user seeks to visit.
The NebuAd System also used DPI to access
cookies sent to and from advertising networks, as
well as the URL of the “referer” page, i.e., the web
page received by the user’s computer immediately
prior to its request for a new page. A cookie is a piece
of text, usually encrypted, that is sent to a user’s
computer by a website. When the user later returns
to the website, the website recognizes the cookie and
thus is able to track a user’s behavior over time.
Cookies are regularly used on the Internet to store
site preferences, retain a user’s shopping cart
contents, or, in the case of advertising networks,
allow the advertising network to recognize the same
user across a wide array of different websites. The
advertising network cookies observed by the NebuAd
system were typically encrypted, meaning they
would have appeared as a long string of numbers
and letters that were unreadable, so the NebuAd
System did not extract any information from them.
The NebuAd System used the long string of
numbers and letters constituting an advertising
network cookie to help create an anonymized
identification number it assigned to each user’s
computer. The System created a profile linked to the
anonymized identification number. Profiles were
associated with a user’s computer solely through the
anonymized identifier number that the NebuAd
System had assigned. NebuAd designed its System
with the intention that it would not have been
possible to “reverse engineer” its anonymized
identifier numbers and identify the actual users
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associated with them. There is no evidence that
anyone ever attempted or succeeded in identifying
any actual users associated with the identifier
numbers or the profiles created by the NebuAd
System. A profile stored information concerning
what the NebuAd System had inferred to be a user’s
market interests, based upon the URLs it obtained.
When the NebuAd System saw a URL that had
previously been identified as reflecting a certain
market interest, the computers in the NebuAd
System converted the URL into a code signifying a
market interest and then deleted the raw data. The
NebuAd System then created or updated a profile to
reflect the market interests it observed. The process
of converting a URL into a code signifying a market
interest and then deleting the raw data likely took
microseconds, and no more than a minute. The
process of extracting URLs, converting them to
predefined market interests, and updating user
profiles was entirely automated and involved no
human intervention. The targeted advertisements
that the NebuAd System served were based upon the
de-identified profiles it had constructed.
Embarq’s Role
NebuAd remotely configured the UTA to make
the device operable. Thereafter, the NebuAd System
collected information, created de-identified user
profiles and served ads. Plaintiffs’ expert, Alissa
Cooper, testified that her understanding of Embarq’s
role with respect to the NebuAd System as the ISP
was that Embarq “furnished the connection to the
NebuAd equipment, so, it essentially connected its
users to the UTA, and it connected the UTA to the
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rest of its networks.” Cooper testified that there was
no other involvement by the ISP, other than it was
paid, and that Embarq did not serve any
advertisements based upon the user profiles
developed by the NebuAd System. Cooper further
testified that Embarq did not have access to the data
collected or the user profiles developed by the
NebuAd System, and that any access Embarq had to
the raw data was access that any ISP ordinarily has
to raw data that flows through the ISP’s network.19
Consent/Privacy Policy
As a condition of the High-Speed Internet
Activation
Customer
Agreement
(“Activation
Agreement”), Embarq subscribers were required to
agree to the terms of Embarq’s Privacy Policy.20 The
Activation Agreement states that
EMBARQ’S
network
gathers
information about Internet usage such
as the sites visited, session lengths, bit
rates, and number of messages and
bytes passes. EMBARQ uses this
information in the aggregate. EMBARQ
may share this aggregated information
with other parties from time to time.
EMBARQ also collects and uses
personally
identifiable
information
obtained from you and from other
sources for billing purposes, to provide
and change service, to anticipate and




19

Doc. 60, Ex. 6.

20

Doc. 60, Ex. 2-A.
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resolve problems with your service, or to
identify, create and inform you of
products and services that better meet
your needs. Except as otherwise
provided in this Section, EMBARQ will
not use or disclose any of your
personally
identifiable
information
unless compelled by a court order or
subpoena, you consent to the use of
disclosure, or to protect its broadband
services and facilities. . . . EMBARQ’s
provision of Services to you is also
subject to EMBARQ’s broadband
privacy policies, which are found at
http://www.embarq.com/legal/privacy.ht
ml/broadbandservices and are hereby
incorporated by reference.21
The
Activation
Agreement
informed
subscribers that “EMBARQ may revise, modify or
discontinue any or all aspects of the Services,
including but not limited to . . . any terms of this
Agreement, upon posting of the new terms on the
EMBARQ website at www.EMBARQ.com.” The
Activation Agreement states that it “is a legally
binding contract that should be read in its entirety,”
and instructs customers to click on the “accept”
button if they agree with each and every term set
forth in the Activation Agreement.22
Embarq’s Privacy Policy, effective November
2007, informed subscribers that “[d]e-identified data




21

Id.

22

Id.
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also might be purchased by or shared with a third
party.” The Privacy Policy further states that
Embarq could disclose to third party business
partners
“customer
proprietary
network
information,” (“CPNI”), which is defined to include
“the websites you visit,” to enable business partners
to assist in providing Embarq’s service. The Privacy
Policy also states that “EMBARQ does not disclose
CPNI and other nonpublic personal information
(such as credit card numbers), without your consent
or direction, except to business partners involved in
providing EMBARQ service to customers or as
required or permitted by law.” Subscribers were also
notified that the Privacy Policy could be updated
periodically to reflect changing practices, specifically
that “[i]f at any point we decide to use personally
identifiable information in a manner that is
materially different from what was stated at the
time it was collected, we will notify you via posting
on this page for 30 days before the material change
is made and give you an opportunity to opt out of the
proposed use at any time.”
Prior to the NebuAd test, Embarq added to
the section of its Privacy Policy concerning “USE OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION” a paragraph entitled,
“Preference Advertising” that stated:
Embarq may use information such as
the websites you visit or online searches
that you conduct to deliver or facilitate
the delivery of targeted advertisements.
The delivery of these advertisements
will be based on anonymous surfing
behavior and will not include users’
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names, email addresses, telephone
numbers, or any other Personally
Identifiable Information.
You may choose to opt out of this
preference advertising service. By
opting out, you will continue to receive
advertisements
as
normal;
but
these advertisements will be less
relevant and less useful to you. If you
would like to opt out, click here.
(embarq.com/adsoptions)
Although all traffic, including that of customers who
opted out, flowed through the UTA, by clicking on
the “opt out” link in the Privacy Policy, a subscriber
could ensure that the NebuAd System would not
create a profile of that subscriber and would not
serve any targeted advertisements to that
subscriber. Plaintiffs did not opt out of the
Preference Advertising service. Kathleen Kirch
testified that she does not recall reviewing Embarq’s
Privacy Policy and that she did not make a practice
of reviewing privacy policies of any Internet service
she signed up for or websites that she visited.
Instead, she just clicked “I agree,” and continued on
to the site. Kirch further testified that she
understood that when she did so, she was bound by
the terms of the policy.23
IV.

Discussion

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class, allege
that for a period exceeding ninety days in 2008,

23
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Embarq, as an ISP, collected and diverted
approximately 26,000 of its Gardner, Kansas
customers’ internet communications to NebuAd, a
third-party internet advertising company, who used
the information to target the customers with
advertisements. Plaintiffs allege Embarq’s actions
constitute a violation of Title II of the ECPA, which
Act amended the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et
seq. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) provides for criminal
penalties where a person “intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral,
or electronic communication,” as well as where one
person “intentionally discloses” to another, or
“intentionally uses or endeavors to use, the contents
of any . . . electronic communication, knowing or
having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a[n] electronic
communication.” By contrast, the civil liability
provision set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2520 states that
“any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in
a civil action recover from the person or entity which
engaged in that violation.”
Embarq argues that it cannot be held civilly
liable under the ECPA because § 2520(a) does not
provide for liability of aiders and abettors and that
Embarq itself did not intercept plaintiffs’ electronic
communications in violation of the ECPA.
Alternatively, Embarq argues that even if it had
intercepted an electronic communication, plaintiffs
consented to the interception and use of their
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electronic communications. The Court addresses
each issue in turn.
A.

Secondary Liability

Plaintiffs argue that the NebuAd System
violated the ECPA because it intercepted or acquired
the “contents” of Embarq’s customers’ Internet
communications. Highly simplified, plaintiffs assert
that “the UTA intercepted and analyzed all of the
traffic that passed through it.” Embarq counters that
the UTA merely identified the port number of a
communication and the URLs acquired by the
NebuAd System were functionally no different from
a telephone number acquired by a pen register; it is
merely the address of the webpage requested by the
user, not the webpage itself, and thus is a “means of
establishing communication.”24 The Court need not
resolve this issue, however, because even assuming
plaintiffs’ position is correct, Embarq cannot be held
secondarily liable for having aided and abetted
NebuAd’s alleged interception.
Plaintiffs argue that Embarq intercepted
communications by routing them to NebuAd’s UTA.
The term “intercept” is specifically defined by the
ECPA to mean the “acquisition of the contents” of a
communication.”25 “Contents” is defined to mean
“the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication.”26 Although the term “acquisition” is




24

See New York Tele. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.

25

18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).

26

18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
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not defined by the statute, “to acquire” commonly
means “to come into possession, control, or power of
disposal.”27 Thus, it follows that in order to
“intercept” a communication, one must come into
possession or control of the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication. The Court agrees
with Embarq that regardless of what information
the
NebuAd
System
extracted
from
the
communications traversing through the UTA, it is
undisputed that Embarq had no access to that
information or to the profiles constructed from that
information.28 As plaintiffs’ expert testified,
Embarq’s role was to install the NebuAd device so as
to furnish the UTA connection to NebuAd. In other
words, the NebuAd device, or “box,” goes into place,
then all of the raw data that flows through Embarq
is directed to that device, where NebuAd does the
analysis and, apparently, separates out the Port 80
traffic. Moreover, plaintiffs cite no authority that
Embarq’s access to the raw data that flowed through
its network constitutes a violation of the ECPA,
which requires an entity to actually acquire the
contents of those communications. There is nothing
in the record that Embarq itself acquired the
contents of any communications as they flowed
through its network; instead, plaintiffs’ theory rests
on the notion that the NebuAd System extracted the

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 18-19 (1986).
27

Incredibly, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel went
so far as to claim that Embarq employees reviewed the raw
data and transported information of their choosing to NebuAd.
Plaintiffs do not cite, nor could the Court locate, anything in
the record to support this assertion, which is contradicted by
testimony of plaintiffs’ experts.
28
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contents
of
the
communications.
Plaintiffs’
assertion that Embarq “endeavored to intercept”
communications falls short of creating civil liability
under the ECPA, which creates liability for actual
interception.
In an apparent effort to avoid this result,
plaintiffs seek to hold Embarq secondarily liable
based upon its contractual relationship with
NebuAd, emphasizing that Embarq licensed the
UTA owned by NebuAd and allowed NebuAd to
access its network. Plaintiffs, in effect, seek to hold
Embarq indirectly liable as a procurer, aider,
abettor, or co-conspirator of NebuAd’s alleged
violation of the ECPA. The civil liability provision of
the ECPA, however, does not provide for secondary
liability, as liability attaches only to the party that
actually intercepted a communication.29 As
numerous courts have consistently held, a defendant
does not “intercept” a communication merely by
allowing or enabling, or even directing, another
party to intercept communications.30 For example, in

29

18 U.S.C. § 2520.

30 See, e.g., Freeman v. DirectTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001,
1005-06 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that “a person
or entity who aids and abets or who enters into a conspiracy is
someone or something that is ‘engaged’ in a violation.”); Doe v.
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[N]othing in the
statute condemns assistants, as opposed to those who directly
perpetrate the act.”); Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158,
168-69 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428,
432-33 (8th Cir. 1996); Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Perkins-Carillo v.
Systemax, Inc., No. 03-2836, 2006 WL 1553957 (N.D. Ga. May
26, 2006); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-2746,
2001 WL 34517252, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
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In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litigation,31 plaintiffs
sought to hold Toys R Us liable under the Wiretap
Act for permitting a third party, Coremetrics, to load
“Web bugs” onto the computers of visitors to Toys R
Us’ website.32 Coremetrics was in the business of
tracking Internet users’ buying and websurfing
habits, and its device enabled it to “monitor,
intercept, transmit, and record all aspects of a
Webuser’s private activity when they access Toys R
Us’ Webpages or other Webpages.”33 The district
court granted Toys R Us’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
Wiretap Act claim, holding that the “plain language
of § 2205(a) now limits its applicability to those who
‘intercept,’ ‘disclose,’ or ‘use’ the communications at
issue” and that Toys R Us could not be held liable
because there was no allegation that Toys R Us itself
intercepted any communications.34 Such is the case
here, and plaintiffs cite no authority to the contrary.
Because the record shows that Embarq did not
acquire any of the information obtained by the
NebuAd System, under the plain language of the
ECPA, Embarq did not itself intercept any
communications and cannot be held secondarily
liable. Accordingly, Embarq is entitled to summary
judgment on this ground.





31

2001 WL 34517252.

32

Id. at *6-7.

33

Id. at *1.

34

Id. at *6-7.

39a
B.

Consent

Embarq is also independently entitled to
summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ consent,
which is expressly excluded from the category of
“unlawful interceptions.”35 In two other cases
brought by plaintiffs’ law firm arising out of NebuAd
System tests conducted in Montana, the district
court dismissed the ECPA count based on similar
language contained in the ISPs’ privacy policies.36 In
those cases, the court considered the Terms of
Service documents of the ISPs, and found that the
plaintiff Internet subscribers were put on notice of
the NebuAd monitoring via the defendant ISPs’
updates to those terms.37 As the court explained,
because that document indicated that “[u]se of [the
ISP’s] Internet access services was expressly subject
to the [Terms of Service]” and the plaintiff continued
to use the Internet, he was bound by the changes to
the agreement and impliedly consented to the
monitoring of his Internet activity.38 Likewise, the

35 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (no liability “where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.”).

See Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. 10-63-BLG-RFC,
2011 WL 1842859 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011); Mortensen v.
Bresnan Commc’ns, L.L.C., No. 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL
5140454 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010). A similar motion to dismiss
on consent grounds is pending in yet another NebuAd case filed
in Illinois, Valentine v. Wideopen West Fin., LLC, Case No. 09cv-7653 (E.D. Ill.).
36

See Deering, 2011 WL 1842859, at *1-3, Mortensen,
2010 WL 5140454, at *4-5.
37

38



Deering, 2011 WL 1842859, at *1-3.
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Court finds that in this case plaintiffs consented to
the use by third parties of their de-identified webbrowsing behavior when they accessed the Internet
under the terms of Embarq’s Privacy Policy,
incorporated by reference into its Activation
Agreement.
Embarq’s Activation Agreement informed
subscribers that “EMBARQ may revise, modify or
discontinue any or all aspects of the Services,
including but not limited to . . . any terms of this
Agreement, upon posting of the new terms on the
EMBARQ website at www.EMBARQ.com.” Plaintiffs
do not dispute that, in advance of the NebuAd test,
Embarq posted a new paragraph in its Privacy
Policy entitled “Preference Advertising,” in which it
informed subscribers that “Embarq may use
information such as the websites you visit or online
searches that you conduct to deliver or facilitate the
delivery of targeted advertisements. The delivery of
these advertisements will be based on anonymous
surfing behavior.” Subscribers were then offered the
opportunity to opt out by clicking on a hypertext
link. Moreover, a preexisting paragraph in the
Privacy Policy informed subscribers that “[d]eidentified data might be purchased by or shared with
a third party.” The pre-existing Privacy Policy also
explained that Embarq would automatically “log the
websites you visit,” and that such information, which
constitutes CPNI, could be shared with “business
partners involved in providing EMBARQ service to
customers.” Thus, as with the Montana cases,
plaintiffs consented to monitoring by using Embarq’s
Internet service after notice, and that notice and
consent defeats their ECPA claim.
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Nevertheless, plaintiffs assert several reasons
why their use of Embarq’s Internet service did not
constitute consent to the NebuAd test. The Court
will briefly address these arguments, which are
without merit. First, plaintiffs argue that the scope
of the disclosure was inadequate because NebuAd is
not identified specifically as a third party with which
information might be shared. Plaintiffs cite no
authority requiring such specific disclosure, and fail
to address the fact that the Privacy Policy expressly
discloses that de-identified data and the websites a
subscriber visits might be shared with third parties.
While it is true that NebuAd was identified
specifically in one of the cases,39 the Montana court
did not appear to make such a distinction, instead
focusing on the fact that the terms of the agreements
and privacy policies in those cases existed and were
in effect before the NebuAd test, and also mentioned
third parties generally.40 Second, plaintiffs’
argument that the notice was not conspicuous
enough is belied by their admission that the
prevailing industry practice among websites is to
disclose their relationship with advertising networks
and the type of information those networks collect,
in their privacy policies. Plaintiffs cite no authority
that such method of disclosure is inadequate, and
the Montana case decisions dismissing on the ground
of consent hold to the contrary.41 Finally, plaintiffs’
argument that the opt-out mechanism was
insufficient because it did not prevent the NebuAd




39

Id. at *2.

40

Id. at *2-3; Mortensen, 2010 WL 5140454, at *5.

41

Id.
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System’s collection of data does not negate their
consent because they did not attempt to opt out.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the opt-out mechanism
was effective in that, by opting out, subscribers did
not receive any targeted advertising.
In sum, plaintiffs were required to agree to
the terms of the Activation Agreement in order to
use Embarq’s Internet service; that Agreement
incorporated the terms of the Privacy Policy, which
informed subscribers that their de-identified data
could be shared with third parties; that Agreement
informed subscribers that the terms could be
changed at any time through posting a new policy at
Embarq’s website; and Embarq modified those terms
in advance of the NebuAd test to add a paragraph
regarding preference advertising, with an opt-out
mechanism. For these reasons, the Court joins with
the Montana court in concluding that plaintiffs gave
or acquiesced their consent to any monitoring or
interception of their Internet activity, and summary
judgment is granted on this ground.42

42 Because the Court grants summary judgment on
secondary liability and consent grounds, it does not reach the
issue of Embarq’s alternative “ordinary course of business”
defense. The Court notes that this defense also appears to have
merit, as plaintiffs have admitted that Embarq conducted the
NebuAd test to further legitimate business purposes and that
behavioral advertising is a widespread business and is
commonplace on the Internet. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) requires an
interception must take place “through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device”; that phrase is defined to exclude
“any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept
a[n] . . . electronic communication” that is “being used by a
provider of wire or electronic communication device in the
ordinary course of business.” Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE
COURT that defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 59) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’
Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 31) is DENIED as
moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 19, 2011
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVACY ACT
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2510 provides, in relevant part:
As used in this chapter—
[…]
(4) “intercept” means the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device.
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device”
means any device or apparatus which can be
used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication other than—
(a) any telephone or telegraph
instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof,
(i) furnished to the subscriber or
user by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service
in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the
subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business or
furnished by such subscriber or
user for connection to the
facilities of such service and used
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in the ordinary course of its
business; or
(ii) being used by a provider of
wire or electronic communication
service in the ordinary course of
its
business,
or
by
an
investigative or law enforcement
officer in the ordinary course of
his duties;
[…]
(8) “contents”, when used with respect to any
wire, oral, or electronic communication,
includes any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication;
[…]
(12) “electronic communication” means any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce, but does not include—
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a
tone-only paging device;
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(C) any communication from a tracking
device (as defined in section 3117 of this
title); or
(D)
electronic
funds
transfer
information stored by a financial
institution in a communications system
used for the electronic storage and
transfer of funds;
(13) “user” means any person or entity who—
(A) uses an electronic communication
service; and
(B) is duly authorized by the provider of
such service to engage in such use;
(14) “electronic communications system”
means any wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for
the transmission of wire or electronic
communications, and any computer facilities
or related electronic equipment for the
electronic storage of such communications;
(15) “electronic communication service” means
any service which provides to users thereof
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications;
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 2511 provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in
this chapter any person who –
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors
to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication;
[…]
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors
to disclose, to any other person the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this
subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to
use, the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or
having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this
subsection; or
[…]
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shall be punished as provided in subsection (4)
or shall be subject to suit as provided in
subsection (5).
(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this
chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of
wire or electronic communication service,
whose facilities are used in the transmission
of a wire or electronic communication, to
intercept, disclose, or use that communication
in the normal course of his employment while
engaged in any activity which is a necessary
incident to the rendition of his service or to
the protection of the rights or property of the
provider of that service, except that a provider
of wire communication service to the public
shall not utilize service observing or random
monitoring except for mechanical or service
quality control checks.
(ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers
of wire or electronic communication service,
their officers, employees, and agents,
landlords, custodians, or other persons, are
authorized to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance to persons authorized
by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic
communications or to conduct electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
if such provider, its officers, employees, or
agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified
person, has been provided with--
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(A) a court order directing such
assistance or a court order pursuant to
section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 signed by the
authorizing judge, or
(B) a certification in writing by a person
specified in section 2518(7) of this title
or the Attorney General of the United
States that no warrant or court order is
required by law, that all statutory
requirements have been met, and that
the specified assistance is required,
setting forth the period of time during which
the provision of the information, facilities, or
technical assistance is authorized and
specifying the information, facilities, or
technical assistance required. No provider of
wire or electronic communication service,
officer, employee, or agent thereof, or
landlord, custodian, or other specified person
shall disclose the existence of any interception
or surveillance or the device used to
accomplish the interception or surveillance
with respect to which the person has been
furnished a court order or certification under
this chapter, except as may otherwise be
required by legal process and then only after
prior notification to the Attorney General or to
the principal prosecuting attorney of a State
or any political subdivision of a State, as may
be appropriate. Any such disclosure, shall
render such person liable for the civil damages
provided for in section 2520. No cause of
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action shall lie in any court against any
provider of wire or electronic communication
service, its officers, employees, or agents,
landlord, custodian, or other specified person
for providing information, facilities, or
assistance in accordance with the terms of a
court order, statutory authorization, or
certification under this chapter.
[…]
(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this subsection, a person or entity providing
an electronic communication service to the
public shall not intentionally divulge the
contents of any communication (other than
one to such person or entity, or an agent
thereof) while in transmission on that service
to any person or entity other than an
addressee or intended recipient of such
communication or an agent of such addressee
or intended recipient.
(b) A person or entity providing electronic
communication service to the public may
divulge
the
contents
of
any
such
communication-(i) as otherwise authorized in section
2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title;
(ii) with the lawful consent of the
originator or any addressee or intended
recipient of such communication;
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(iii) to a person employed or authorized,
or whose facilities are used, to forward
such communication to its destination;
or
(iv) which were inadvertently obtained
by the service provider and which
appear to pertain to the commission of a
crime, if such divulgence is made to a
law enforcement agency.
[…]
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides, in relevant part:
Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii),
any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of this chapter
may in a civil action recover from the person
or entity, other than the United States, which
engaged in that violation such relief as may be
appropriate.

